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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
is very great to try to convict the accused of the only offense which carries
a penalty at all commensurate with what he would have received if his
victim had not had such a strong constitution. G. W. S., '33.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS--SUIT WHERE GOVERN-
MENT NOT RECOGNIZED.-An act of Congress provides that "whenever the
United States shall requisition any contract, . .. requisition, acquire or
take over any ship," it shall make just compensation therefor, and that in
case of dissatisfaction as to the amount awarded an action may be insti-
tuted against the United States in the Court of Claims for the alleged dif-
ference. The plaintiff was a Russian corporation organized under the
Kerensky government and was the assignee of certain ship-building con-
tracts which were taken over by the United States. The Kerensky regime
was later overthrown and with the institution of the new government an
edict was issued whereby all corporations were abolished and their assets
confiscated. In a suit for additional compensation for the taking of the
contracts, it was held that the corporation could maintain an action in the
Court of Claims, no point being made of the plaintiff's corporate capacity,
irrespective both of the non-recognition by the United States of the present
Russian government, and of the lack of right on the part of American citi-
zens to prosecute claims against the Russian government. Russian Volun-
teer Fleet v. U. S. (1931) 51 S. Ct. 229.
A court need not recognize the decrees of a government which has not
been recognized either as a de facto or as a de jure government. Nueva
Anna (1821) 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 193. The cases intimate, however, that
courts may in their discretion, with a view to international policy and
justice between the parties, accord such decrees extraterritorial effect in
certain particular instances. Note (1925) 37 A. L. R. 747; see Sokoloff WV.
Nat. City Bank (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917; Aksionairnoye
Obschestvo v. Sagor (1921) 1 K. B. 456, reversed on other grounds (1921)
3 K. B. 532.
However, the question arises, as to right of the remaining directors of
the corporation to sue and receive money for the corporation, its existence
in Russia having been terminated, its assets confiscated, its function ended,
and its stockholders scattered. No issue is made of this point in the present
case, the defendants admitting the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this
action for and in the name of the corporation. In a similar situation where
an action was brought by the remaining directors of a Russian corpora-
tion for money deposited in a New York bank, the New York court held
that it made no difference that the corporation had been abolished and that
the purpose for which it had been created had ceased; as long as there was
a sufficient representation of the corporation the suit could be maintained
in spite of the possibility of the defendant being subject to double liability.
Petrogradsky Mejunardony Kommerchesky v. Nat. City Bank (1930) 253
N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479. In concluding the court said, "The directors, men of
honor presumably, will be charged with the duties of trustees and will be
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subject to prosecution if these duties are ignored." This is the only men-
tion made of the possibility of other stockholders looking to the directors
for payment of their share of the amount recovered. But where an action
was brought by the remaining directors of a Russian insurance corpora-
tion, against a bank which was trustee of a sum deposited with it by the
corporation in accordance with a statute for the benefit of creditors, the
court held that because of the possibility of the defendant's being liable to
the corporation's successors in foreign countries where the decrees of the
Soviet government were recognized, the plaintiffs could not recover. Russian
Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703. The
former case was distinguished from this one, in that in the first there was a
legal liability, whereas in this case the liability was one enforceable in
equity.
However, a further conjectural issue arises as to what would have been
the status of the plaintiff in the instant case if the United States had recog-
nized Russia at the time of this suit. Perhaps provisions for such situations
would have been made by treaty. But if they were not and a suit were
brought by the remaining directors, the Soviet decree might be disregarded
upon the ground that it operated retroactively in the particular case.
T. L., '32.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY OF CO-EMPLOYEE-SCOPE OF EMPLOY-
MENT.-Plaintiff was engaged in eating her lunch during the lunch hour at
the place of her employment when another employee of the same concern
jerked the chair from under her, causing her to fall. Held, the fellow serv-
ant's act was not in the scope of his employment, nor was there evidence
sufficient to show a ratification by the employer of his conduct, sufficient to
render the employer liable for the injuries sustained. Gess v. Wagner
Electric Mfg. Co. (Mo. 1930) 31 S. W. (2d) 785.
Under the fellow-servant rule a master is not liable for the injuries to a
servant caused by the negligence of a fellow servant engaged in the same
general business where the master has exercised due care in the selection of
his servants. Martin v. Morrison (1929) 32 F. (2d) 400; Encarnacion v.
Jamison (1929) 251 N. Y. 218, 167 N. E. 422; Walsh v. Eubanks (Ark.
1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 762. The employee is held to have assumed the risks
connected with the employment. But the doctrine does not apply when the
servant has injured his fellow servant in a wilful, malicious, or reckless
manner, provided he has acted in the scope of his employment. Richard v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. (1919) 79 N. H. 380, 109 Atl. 88; Alden Mills v. Pender-
graft (Miss. 1928) 115 So. 713.
The question of the scope of employment must be determined by what
the servant was employed to perform and by what he actually did perform,
rather than by the mere verbal designation of his position. Marshall v.
United Ry8. Co. of St. Louis (Mo. App. 1916) 184 S. W. 159; Brayman v.
Russell & Pugh Lumber Co. (1917) 31 Idaho 140, 169 Pac. 932. Where
some connection with the employment, or a -motive for furthering and act-
ing with reference to it is found, recovery has been allowed. Thus where
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